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ABSTRACT 
 
Spacecraft and launch vehicle stages abandoned in 
Earth orbit have historically been a primary source of 
debris from accidental explosions.  In the future, such 
satellites will become the principal cause of orbital 
debris via inadvertent collisions.  To curtail both the 
near-term and far-term risks posed by derelict spacecraft 
and launch vehicle stages to operational space systems, 
numerous national and international orbital debris 
mitigation guidelines specifically recommend actions 
which could prevent or limit such future debris 
generation.  Although considerable progress has been 
made in implementing these recommendations, some 
changes to existing vehicle designs can be difficult.  
Moreover, the nature of some missions also can present 
technological and budgetary challenges to be compliant 
with widely accepted orbital debris mitigation measures. 
 
1. BACKGROUND 
 
As a result of the increasing number of debris in low 
Earth orbit (LEO), numerous national and international 
orbital debris mitigation guidelines recommend 
restricting the orbital lifetimes of spacecraft and launch 
vehicle stages residing in or passing through LEO after 
mission termination.  The primary purpose of this action 
is to enhance space safety by significantly constraining 
the potential of future accidental collisions, which in 
turn could result in the creation of large numbers of new 
orbital debris.   
 
Not surprisingly, the majority of mass in Earth orbit 
today (> 5000 metric tons) resides in non-operational 
spacecraft and launch vehicle stages.  This mass also 
represents the largest segment of cross-sectional area, 
i.e., collision hazard, for future debris generation.  In the 
1980’s, early National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) projections of the potential 
long-term growth of the Earth’s satellite population 
identified the increasing amount of mass in Earth orbit 
as a significant source of collision-derived debris, 
beginning in the 21st century.   
 
During the 20-year period from January 1987 to January 
2007, the number of spacecraft in Earth orbit increased 
by 80%, and the amount of related mass more than 
doubled (Figs. 1 and 2).   
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Figure 1. The accumulation of spacecraft and launch vehicle stages in Earth orbit has now exceeded 4500. 
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Figure 2. Although the annual growth rate of launch vehicle stage mass in Earth orbit has fallen during the past decade, 
the combined rate of accumulation of mass has recently (2004 to 2007) been more than 130 metric tons per year. 
 
 
The total cross-sectional area of spacecraft and stages 
has increased at an even faster rate.  During 2006, 87% 
(55 of 63) of space missions left at least one spacecraft 
or launch vehicle stage in or transiting LEO.  
Consequently, a limitation on the orbital longevity of 
satellites placed into LEO is desired to better preserve 
the near-Earth environment. 
 
Likewise, the passivation, i.e., the removal of residual 
stored energies, of these non-functional objects while 
they remain in orbit is important to prevent the 
generation of debris via self-induced explosions.  To 
date approximately 90% of all known satellite breakups 
have involved explosions of spacecraft and launch 
vehicle stages which had been abandoned in orbit after 
mission termination.   
 
2. NASA POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In 1995 NASA released the first detailed set of orbital 
debris mitigation guidelines [1].  Two of the guidelines 
specifically addressed the issues of passivation and LEO 
longevity. 
 
2.1. Postmission Prevention of Satellite Explosions 
 
One of NASA’s policy objectives is to control the 
amount of orbital debris generated by accidental 
explosions.  Such explosions could occur either during 
or after the conclusion of the mission, if the spacecraft 
or launch vehicle stage were to be left in Earth orbit.  
Guideline 4-2 of the aforementioned document is 
entitled “Limiting the risk to other space systems from 
accidental explosions after completion of mission 
operations” and states that 
 
“All on-board sources of energy will be depleted 
when they are no longer required for mission 
operations or postmission disposal.  Depletion 
should occur as soon as such an operation does not 
pose an unacceptable risk to the payload.” [2] 
 
The NASA safety standard goes on to identify typical 
systems that should be passivated, including propulsion 
and pressurant systems, electrical power systems, 
attitude control systems, and range safety systems.  
More than a decade of experience with this guideline 
has revealed that the primary actions should include the 
following: 
 
• the expenditure by burning or venting of all 
residual propellants, 
• the release of all pressurants, 
• the discharge of all batteries and their 
disconnection from charging circuits, 
• the removal of electrical power from control 
moment gyroscopes, and 
• the deactivation of range safety control units. 
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Propellants and pressurants have been the primary 
source of explosions involving non-operational 
spacecraft and launch vehicles stages.  Such explosions 
have come as early as the first hour in space or as late as 
25 years after launch.  The most severe accidental 
satellite break-ups have been propellant- or pressurant-
induced.  The worst accidental fragmentation was 
apparently caused by the failure of a pressure regulator 
between a high-pressure helium tank and a hydrazine 
propellant tank on a Pegasus launch vehicle upper stage, 
two years after a successful payload delivery mission 
[3].  The cause of a large number of explosions has been 
assessed to be due to over-pressurized or inadvertent 
detonation of residual propellants [4]. 
 
Spacecraft and launch vehicle designers and operators 
should have a goal of complete passivation of propellant 
and pressurant systems.  Even leaving modest residual 
pressures (e.g., 10% of tank maximum expected 
operating pressure, aka MEOP) and small amounts of 
propellants can lead either to a direct explosion or to an 
enhancement of damage (i.e., new orbital debris) in the 
event of a future collision. 
 
The subject of spacecraft battery disconnection from 
charging circuits can sometimes lead to extensive 
debates between the operational community and those 
responsible for environmental safety.  Leak-before-burst 
designs, while beneficial, do not eliminate the 
possibility of an explosion.  Inadvertent disconnection 
of the battery from the charging line can easily be 
avoided with separate, multiple separation systems.  If 
planned early in the design phase, such circuits are low 
cost and low weight. 
 
Some exceptions to the rules have also arisen.  Many 
modern spacecraft batteries are highly pressurized and 
cannot easily be depressurized at the end of mission.  If 
properly disconnected from charging circuits, these 
batteries are normally safe despite their internal 
pressures.  Launch vehicle batteries are designed for 
short lifetimes and typically discharge quickly with no 
means of recharging on orbit.  Hence, no special actions 
are normally required. 
 
Heat pipes by design contain internal fluids at high 
pressure and, again, are not easily depressurized.  On 
the other hand, these ruggedly-built systems have never 
been identified as the likely source of a satellite break-
up.  Therefore, depressurization of heat pipes is 
currently not considered a requirement to comply with 
passivation guidelines. 
 
Unused pyrotechnic charges which are designed to 
activate a system, but which are not capable of causing 
vehicle fragmentation, need not be fired at the time of 
decommissioning.  Should these charges accidentally 
fire in the future, the result should not be the generation 
of orbital debris. 
 
2.2. Curtailment of Postmission Orbital Longevity 
 
NASA space debris mitigation Guideline 6-1 addresses 
the physical disposition of spacecraft and launch vehicle 
stages residing in or passing through LEO.  The 
objective is to ensure the removal of the satellite from 
the LEO region no later than 25 years after the end of 
vehicle operations.  The three major removal options 
cited in the guideline are (1) controlled or uncontrolled 
atmospheric reentry, (2) transfer to a disposal orbit 
above LEO, and (3) direct retrieval, e.g., with the U.S. 
Space Shuttle. 
 
With rare exceptions uncontrolled atmospheric reentry 
of spacecraft and launch vehicle stages is chosen for 
compliance with this guideline.  For vehicles in low 
orbits (typically below 600 km), natural orbital decay 
will be sufficient to meet the 25-year restriction.  For 
objects in higher orbits which would normally 
experience longer orbital lifetimes, some explicit action 
is required to shorten the time in Earth orbit.   
 
Often the most effective action is to lower the perigee of 
the satellite at the end of mission to a value from which 
atmospheric drag will cause the vehicle to reenter within 
25 years.  This option has been selected by several of 
the satellites of NASA’s Earth Observation System, 
which operates at a mean altitude of 705 km, and by 
many launch vehicle stages which can use their residual 
propellants to move to lower orbits after the delivery of 
their payloads.  In addition to typical high-thrust burns, 
such maneuvers could be effected by long-duration, 
low-thrust propulsion systems, by momentum or 
electromagnetic tethers, by drag augmentation devices, 
or by other means. 
 
The 25-year longevity constraint is measured from the 
end of mission of the vehicle in question.  For 
spacecraft, the mission duration might be five, ten, or 
more years.  For launch vehicle stages, the 25-year 
clock normally starts on the day of launch. 
 
A decision to employ the reentry option often results in 
replacing a future risk to the space environment with a 
near-term risk to people and property on Earth.  
Consequently, NASA Guideline 7-1 seeks to limit the 
risk of human casualty to no more than 1 in 10,000 per 
reentry event.  In the case of a controlled reentry, an 
atmospheric interface point can be chosen to place the 
footprint of all surviving debris over broad ocean areas 
and uninhabited territories.  For the more common 
uncontrolled reentries, human casualty risks are 
normally driven by the design and construction of the 
space vehicle, i.e., the number, size, and mass of 
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components which survive to the surface of the Earth.  
To further limit human casualty risks, NASA evaluates 
the risk potential for each new spacecraft early in the 
design phase and has established a design-to-demise 
program which emphasizes material selection and 
construction techniques that reduce the number and 
mass of surviving components. 
 
3. OTHER ORBITAL DEBRIS MITIGATION 
POLICIES 
 
During the past decade a growing number of space 
agencies and national governments have published 
orbital debris mitigation guidelines.  Although these 
documents vary in composition and complexity, their 
guidelines bear remarkable similarity.  In fact, it has 
been this general consensus of opinion which has led to 
the relatively rapid development of international orbital 
debris mitigation guidelines. 
 
3.1. U.S. Government 
 
In 1997 NASA and the U.S. Department of Defense 
began drafting a set of orbital debris mitigation standard 
practices for use by all U.S. government organizations 
responsible for the design or operation of spacecraft and 
launch vehicles.  The existing NASA orbital debris 
mitigation guidelines were used as the basis for 
developing the standard practices.  After consultations 
with industry and other government departments and 
agencies, the U.S. Government Orbital Debris 
Mitigation Standard Practices was officially adopted in 
February 2001. 
 
With regard to passivation and permitted LEO 
postmission longevity, the standard practices closely 
follow the mitigation guidelines of NASA.  
 
Standard Practice 2-2 states “All on-board sources of 
stored energy of a spacecraft or upper stage should be 
depleted or safed when they are no longer required for 
mission operations or postmission disposal.  Depletion 
should occur as soon as such an operation does not pose 
an unacceptable risk to the payload.  Propellant 
depletion burns and compressed gas releases should be 
designed to minimize the probability of subsequent 
accidental collision and to minimize the impact of a 
subsequent accidental explosion.”  
 
Standard Practice 4-1 addresses postmission disposal of 
space structures and contains guidance for the three 
basic options of atmospheric reentry, transfer to a long-
lived storage orbit, and retrieval.  This standard practice 
also adopts the 25-year postmission limit for LEO 
vehicles and the 1 in 10,000 human casualty risks for 
individual reentry events. 
3.2. Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination 
Committee (IADC) 
 
The IADC was established in 1997 for the purpose of 
exchanging scientific and technical data on the orbital 
debris environment and promoting debris mitigation 
measures.  The organization is now comprised of the 
space agencies of 10 nations (China, France, Germany, 
India, Italy, Japan, the Russian Federation, the Ukraine, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States), as well as 
the European Space Agency. 
 
In 1999 the IADC undertook an action item to develop 
the first consensus set of orbital debris mitigation 
guidelines for the world’s major space agencies.  At the 
Second World Space Congress in Houston, Texas, in 
2002, the IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines 
was accepted by all members [5]. 
 
Guideline 5.2.1 seeks to minimize the potential for 
postmission break-ups resulting from stored energy.  It 
reads, in part: 
 
“In order to limit the risk to other space systems 
from accidental break-ups after the completion of 
mission operations, all on-board sources of stored 
energy of a space system, such as residual 
propellants, batteries, high-pressure vessels, self-
destructive devices, flywheels and momentum 
wheels, should be depleted or safed when they are 
no longer required for mission operations or post-
mission disposal.  Depletion should occur as soon 
as this operation does not pose an unacceptable risk 
to the payload.  Mitigation measures should be 
carefully designed not to create other risks.”   
 
The topic of disposal of space structure passing through 
the LEO region is addressed by Guideline 5.3.2: 
 
“Whenever possible, space systems that are 
terminating their operational phases in orbits that pass 
through the LEO region, or have the potential to 
interfere with the LEO region, should be de-orbited 
(direct re-entry is preferred) or where appropriate, 
maneuvered into an orbit with a reduced lifetime.  
Retrieval is also a disposal option.” 
 
This latter guideline goes on to note that studies by the 
IADC and others have found “25 years to be a 
reasonable and appropriate lifetime limit” [6]. 
 
3.3. United Nations 
 
Space debris has been an agenda item for the Scientific 
and Technical Subcommittee (STSC) of the United 
Nations’ Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
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Space (COPUOS) since 1994.  In 1999, after a four-year 
effort, the STSC produced an assessment of the severity 
of the space debris environment [7].  During 2003 and 
2004 the STSC evaluated the then new IADC Space 
Debris Mitigation Guidelines and, during the next 
two years, developed its own similar set of mitigation 
recommendations [8]. 
 
Explicitly derived from the IADC Space Debris 
Mitigation Guidelines, the STSC guidelines follow the 
former’s lead in its handling of space vehicle 
passivation and postmission orbital longevity: 
 
Guideline 5:  “In order to limit the risk to other 
spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages from 
accidental breakups, all on-board sources of stored 
energy should be depleted or made safe when they 
are no longer required for mission operations or 
post-mission disposal.” 
Guideline 6:  “Limit the long-term presence of 
spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages in 
low-Earth orbit (LEO) region after the end of 
the mission.” 
 
4. RECENT APPLICATIONS OF SPACECRAFT 
AND LAUNCH VEHICLE DISPOSAL 
GUIDELINES 
 
The response of most members of the international 
aerospace community to these guidelines on the 
disposal of spacecraft and launch vehicle stages in 
LEO has been very positive.  For example, in 2006 
NASA conducted three flights of the Space Shuttle 
and launched four robotic missions, as shown in 
Table. 1.   
 
 
 
Table 1 — NASA space missions of 2006 
 
Mission Launch Date Destination Other Objects Produced
New Horizons 19 January Pluto No objects left in Earth orbit
ST-5 (A, B, C) 22 March Elliptical Earth Orbit
One rocket body and one mission-related debris in short-lived 
orbits
Cloudsat / Calipso 28 April LEO
Rocket body decayed; one mission-related debris to decay 
within 25 years 
STS-121 04 July LEO (ISS) No debris left in Earth orbit
STS-115 09 September LEO (ISS) No debris left in Earth orbit
STEREO A and B 26 October Heliocentric Orbit
One rocket body and one mission-related debris in short-lived 
orbits
STS-116 10 December LEO (ISS)
Six small payloads and three mission-related debris in short-
lived orbits
 
 
 
 
 
Very few orbital debris were generated during the 
deployment and operation of these missions, and all of 
the LEO objects associated with these missions have 
already reentered or will reenter within the 
recommended 25-year period. 
 
NASA is also applying orbital debris mitigation 
guidelines to older spacecraft, some in orbit for over  
20 years.  The agency’s Earth Radiation Budget 
Experiment (ERBS) spacecraft had been operating near 
600 km for nearly 18 years in 2002 when the 
spacecraft’s perigee was lowered more than 50 km 
to ensure that the vehicle would naturally decay 
within 25 years after its end of mission (Fig. 3).   
 
5 
490
500
510
520
530
540
550
560
570
580
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
 Apogee
 Perigee
A
lti
tu
de
  (
km
)
 
Figure 3. The orbit of NASA’s ERBS spacecraft was lowered three years before its end of mission to ensure 
 that its subsequent orbital lifetime would be less than 25 years, in compliance with NASA  
and national orbital debris mitigation guidelines. 
 
As part of the decommissioning process for the 
spacecraft in 2005, all residual propellants were 
expended during a two-month interval.  In fact, the 
lowering of the orbit three years earlier was fortuitous, 
since ERBS’s propulsion system had further degraded 
and was no longer capable of such a maneuver. 
 
NASA’s Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite (UARS) 
also reached the end of its mission in 2005 after highly 
successful operations for 14 years.  The satellite’s 
remaining propellant was expended from a nearly 
circular orbit over 550 km high, reducing its mean 
altitude by more than 100 km and significantly 
accelerating its natural orbital decay to less than five 
years (Fig. 4).  Most of the propellant was used to lower 
perigee, which leads to the shortest remaining orbital 
lifetime.
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Figure 4. Near the end of its mission, NASA’s UARS spacecraft maneuvered 
 into a lower orbit with a lifetime of less than five years. 
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The commercial Globalstar network of communications 
satellites operates in an orbit of approximately 1415 km.  
From this altitude considerable energy would be required 
to transfer the vehicles to a lower orbit with a lifetime of 
only 25 years.  Less energy is needed to raise a Globalstar 
spacecraft to an orbit above LEO, i.e., above 2000 km.  
Although the spacecraft were deployed in the 1990’s 
before any U.S. Government regulations on satellite 
disposal had been issued, some of the spacecraft have 
sufficient propellant remaining at the end of their missions 
to reach an altitude near to or in excess of 2000 km.   
Fig. 5 indicates the orbital history of one of the first 
Globalstar satellites.  After completing its communications 
mission in 2001, the vehicle was maneuvered into an 
orbit 100 km higher for more than three years of 
extended spacecraft systems tests.  Then, in 2005, the 
spacecraft employed its residual propellant to reach a 
disposal orbit of nearly 1900 km.  Two other Globalstar 
spacecraft in a similar test bed orbit are expected to reach 
2000 km when their secondary mission is completed. 
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Figure 5. Globalstar spacecraft will be sent to disposal orbits above LEO or as close to 2000 km as possible. 
 
 
For a new mission, the most cost-effective time to 
ensure that disposal guidelines can be met for both 
the spacecraft and its launch vehicle orbital stages is 
in the early spacecraft design phase.  At NASA, the 
first such evaluation is required at the time of the 
spacecraft Preliminary Design Review.  An excellent 
example of how the process can work is NASA’s 
Solar Dynamics Observatory.  The 3200-kg 
spacecraft is scheduled to be launched in 2008 by an 
Atlas V launch vehicle for a five-year scientific 
mission in an inclined geosynchronous orbit.  
 
In accordance with NASA Safety Standard 1740.14, the 
first orbital debris assessment report was submitted to 
the office of the Chief Safety Officer in March 2004.  At 
the time, three potential non-compliance items were noted: 
 
1. no means of venting unused helium pressurant 
from the spacecraft were available, 
2. the spacecraft battery could not be disconnected 
from its charging circuit at end of mission, and 
3. the disposal orbit of the Centaur upper stage 
and its subsequent reentry risk did not meet 
NASA guidelines. 
 
However, by the time of the Critical Design Review one 
year later, all three problems had been resolved.  A 
bypass valve was added to permit venting of the helium  
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pressurant.  A relay was added to the power subsystem 
to permit isolating the battery at end of mission.  The 
mission deployment profile was altered to leave the 
Centaur upper stage in an acceptable orbit between LEO 
and geostationary orbit.  This decision also eliminated 
the concern about reentry risks.  In the end, cost-
effective solutions were found to meet all orbital debris 
mitigation objectives without impacting spacecraft 
reliability or the program schedule. 
 
The disposal of launch vehicle orbital stages can 
sometimes present significant orbital debris mitigation 
challenges.  One of the reasons for this is that the 
selection of a launch vehicle is often made after the 
design of the spacecraft is largely complete.  This 
situation can leave little trade-space to meet launch 
vehicle disposal requirements.  On the other hand, early 
planning can lead to some remarkably innovative and 
effective solutions. 
 
One of the greatest success stories involving the disposal 
of launch vehicle stages is found in the deployment of 
three U.S. commercial LEO communications networks 
in the late 1990’s.  In all, 175 spacecraft were launched 
within only a few years to establish the Globalstar, 
Iridium, and Orbcomm networks.  To accomplish this 
feat, five different types of launch vehicles from three 
countries were employed:  Delta and Pegasus from the 
United States, Proton and Soyuz from the Russian 
Federation, and Long March from the People’s Republic 
of China. 
 
Even with extensive use of flying multiple satellites on 
a single launch vehicle, a total of 53 stages were 
initially placed into low Earth orbits.  For the Globalstar 
and Iridium constellations, spacecraft were released into 
initial staging orbits well below the intended operational 
orbits.  From here, the spacecraft propelled themselves 
to the desired altitudes, leaving their launch vehicle 
stages in short-lived orbits.  The orbital longevities of 
the launch vehicle stages were further dramatically 
shortened by controlled de-orbits (Proton and Soyuz) 
and by perigee-lowering maneuvers (Delta, Long March, 
and Pegasus).  Of the 53 stages, only a few still remain 
in orbit, and only four will fail to meet the 25-year-
lifetime objective, two of which are due to launch 
vehicle malfunctions. 
 
A comprehensive assessment of the disposal of all 
orbital stages launched around the world in 2006 is also 
very encouraging.  In total, 63 space launchings to Earth 
orbit or beyond left behind 65 orbital stages.  By the end 
of the year, 20 stages had already fallen back to Earth, 
and 36 stages remained with perigees in LEO.  Of these, 
29 are expected to reenter within 25 years from date of 
launch.  Hence, a total of 88% of the stages with initial 
perigees in LEO are expected to be compliant with 
recommended orbital lifetime restrictions.  Nearly all 
launch vehicle orbital stages world-wide are also 
passivated at the end of mission. 
 
One final example of note was the Delta IV mission of 
November 2006, which placed a U.S. meteorological 
spacecraft into an operational orbit of 850 km.  After 
separation of the payload and at the end of its first 
revolution about the Earth, the main engine of the Delta 
IV second stage was reignited to effect a controlled 
reentry over a mid-Pacific Ocean region (Fig. 6).  Not 
only was the stage immediately removed from Earth 
orbit and eliminated as a potential target for future 
accidental satellite collisions, but also the directed 
reentry over a broad ocean area ensured that any risk of 
human casualty from surviving debris in an 
uncontrolled reentry was prevented. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. A Delta IV second stage was able to execute a 
controlled de-orbit from an altitude of 850 km after 
delivering its payload in November 2006. 
 
 
5. COMPLIANCE AND REMAINING 
CHALLENGES 
 
Overall, compliance with both end-of-mission 
passivation and LEO-lifetime limitation guidelines for 
both spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages is 
improving, due to the increasing promotion of these 
guidelines by space agencies and national regulatory 
organizations and due to the inherent self-interest of the 
aerospace industry, which seeks to avoid further 
contamination of near-Earth space.  However, changes 
to long-established designs and processes can 
sometimes be difficult to achieve, even if costs are 
minimal. 
 
Some spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages are 
still not completely passivated at end of mission, but 
their risk of subsequent explosion is typically low.  Over 
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time, these systems will be replaced with newer, more 
compliant designs. 
 
Perhaps the greatest challenge to most spacecraft and 
launch vehicle designers and operators is limiting 
orbital lifetimes in LEO after a mission has been 
accomplished.  Most LEO spacecraft inserted into 
operational orbits above 700 km will not naturally fall 
back to Earth within 30 to 35 years, i.e., mission 
lifetimes of 5-10 years plus 25 years after end of 
mission.  Moreover, due to very little atmospheric drag 
at such altitudes, many spacecraft have minimal or no 
maneuver capabilities and, thus, are unable to perform 
significant perigee-lowering maneuvers when 
decommissioned.  Some potential solutions are the 
addition or upgrade of propulsion systems, drag 
enhancement devices (such as deployable or inflatable 
lightweight structures), and momentum or 
electrodynamic tethers.  However, many of these 
concepts can involve non-trivial direct and indirect costs.  
 
Whereas some launch vehicle orbital stages have 
demonstrated the ability to perform major maneuvers 
after completing their payload delivery missions, others 
are currently constrained by design or mission 
requirements.  Some of these limitations could be 
overcome by technical alterations to the vehicles with 
very little additional weight.  More problematic are 
solid-propellant orbital stages used to deliver payloads 
to orbits above 650 km.  Such stages normally do not 
fall back to Earth within 25 years and have little or no 
ability to execute post-delivery maneuvers. 
 
Although not a major focus of this paper, the issue of 
human casualty risk from uncontrolled spacecraft and 
launch vehicle stage reentries remains a serious one, 
particularly for objects with a mass of 1000 kg or more.  
The principal solutions are either to conduct more 
controlled de-orbits with their associated payload 
penalties or to construct vehicles in a manner that fewer 
components will survive the intense conditions of 
reentry.  The previously mentioned NASA program of 
design-to-demise is making noticeable inroads in this 
area by replacing materials with high melting points 
with those of lower melting temperatures.  
 
6. SUMMARY 
 
Controlling the orbital debris population is now widely 
recognized as essential for preserving near-Earth space 
for the use of future generations.  During the past two 
decades, substantial progress has been made on both 
technical and policy levels.  The implementation of 
orbital debris mitigation guidelines, now recommended 
by all the major space-faring countries as well as the 
United Nations, is steadily gaining ground. 
 
The most influential actions for the future space 
environment are those involving the disposal of 
spacecraft and launch vehicle stages in LEO.  The 
passivation of space vehicles at the end of their missions 
and the limitation of their subsequent orbital lifetimes 
are clearly the two most important issues.  Addressing 
these issues early in the initial system definition phase 
will lead to the most efficient and cost-effective 
solutions.  The examples cited above demonstrate the 
many accomplishments in meeting space vehicle 
disposal guidelines and the commitment of both 
industry and policy-makers to achieve even greater 
compliance. 
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